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Avian Influenza: What the family
practitioner should know
Introduction
Human immunity to influenza A virus
depends on the specific subtype.
Mortality after exposure to subtypes
commonly causing human infection
is low (approximately 0.1%). Other
subtypes are specifically adapted to
cause disease in birds. These
subtypes are known as ‘avian
i n f l u e n z a ’ .  U n d e r  c e r t a i n
circumstances avian influenza can
also be transmitted to humans,
causing a severe infection known as
highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI), with a mortality currently
exceeding 50%.
Avian influenza occurs naturally
in wild and domesticated birds,
especially migratory waterfowl, where
the virus is carried in their intestines.
Infected birds shed the virus in saliva,
nasal secretions and feces and
susceptible birds become infected
on contact with these secretions.
Several cases of avian influenza
in humans have occurred since 1997.
Humans may become infected after
contact with infected poultry, infected
animals e.g. pigs or contaminated
surfaces. Symptoms vary from flu-like
symptoms (fever, myalgia, cough,
rhinorrhea, sore throat, vomiting and
watery diarrhea) to viral pneumonia
and acute respiratory distress. Almost
all patients with HPAI have clinically
apparent pneumonia.
The epidemiology of human
infection with influenza virus
Subtypes of the influenza virus differ,
based upon glycoproteins on the
sur face of the virus i .e. the
haemagglutinin (HA) protein and the
neuraminidase (NA) protein. Although
there are sixteen different HA
subtypes and nine different NA
subtypes for influenza A virus, only a
few commonly infect humans, i.e.
subtypes H1N1, H1N2, H3N21.
Minor mutations called ‘antigenic
drifts’ due to poor RNA copying may
occur in subtypes of human influenza
virus, which cause the virus to be less
recognizable to the human immune
system.  These mutations are
responsible for outbreaks or
epidemics in populations. Pandemics
are caused when subtypes from
different species of virus re-assort
genetic material and merge.  These
more  d ramat ic  gene t ic  re -
arrangements are called ‘antigenic
shifts’ and are responsible for a
change in genotype, creating new
subtypes with new combinations of
proteins on the surface of the virus.
Populations have no previous
exposure to these new subtypes and
therefore have had no opportunity to
develop immunity against them.
Antigenic shift probably occurs when
humans live in close proximity to
domestic poultry and pigs. Pigs are
susceptible to both avian and
mammalian influenza A viruses and
can serve as a host for recombination
of genetic influenza material, resulting
in a new subtype able to infect
humans2. Once a pandemic influenza
virus has spread it normally becomes
established in the population and
subsequently circulates as seasonal
epidemics of influenza.
The history of influenza
pandemics
Several pandemics have claimed
millions of lives during the last
century3.  The most significant of these
were the following:
1918-19 “Spanish flu” subtype
H1N1. 675 000 Deaths occurred in
the USA and approximately 400
million infections and 30 - 50 million
deaths occurred wor ldwide.
1957-58 “Asian flu” subtype H2N2,
was first identified in China early in
1957 and subsequently spread to the
USA by the middle of 1957, where
approximately 70 000 people died.
1968-69 “Hong Kong flu” subtype
H3N2, caused about 34 000 deaths
in the USA.
Since 1997 three prominent avian
influenza A subtypes have affected
humans4 but the H5N1 subtype is
cause for par t icular concern
because5:
• It mutates rapidly
• It can acquire genes from viruses
infecting other animal species
• It is highly pathogenic and can
cause severe disease in humans
• Birds that survive this infection
excrete H5N1 for at least 10 days,
orally and in feces facilitating
further spread
• If more humans become infected
over time, humans infected with
both human and avian influenza
may cause the emergence of a
novel subtype easily transmissible
in the human population
The next pandemic
Outbreaks of influenza A (H5N1), a
subtype not previously associated
with human disease, occurred among
poultry in eight countries in Asia
during 2003-56. Currently 25 countries
are affected including Austria, France,
Germany, Bosnia Herzegovina and
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Nigeria7. Human infections with this
subtype were subsequently reported
in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia,
China, Turkey and Iraq. Indonesia has
also confirmed 26 cases, 19 of which
were fatal8, confirming that this
subtype has managed to cross over
to human hosts.
According to the WHO 170
laboratory confirmed cases of HPAI
have been identified with 92 deaths
by 20/02/20068, exceeding a mortality
of 50%. Although the majority of cases
occurred due to infected poultry
c o n t a c t ,  h u m a n  t o  h u m a n
transmission may also have occurred,
although spread have not continued
beyond one person. Because these
viruses do not commonly infect
humans there is no immune protection
against them, and if the virus mutates
further to acquire the ability to spread
from human to human, we may be
faced with the next influenza
pandemic. According to the WHO a
global influenza pandemic could
claim between 5 million and 150
million lives depending on what
preventative steps are taken.
Diagnosis, treatment and
prevention of serious
infections with influenza virus
The management of serious influenza
infection and prevention of the spread
of this disease relies on early
diagnosis, specific antiviral drugs,
vaccines and infection control
measures.
Laboratory diagnosis: The clinical
diagnosis can be confirmed with virus
culture done at certain reference
laboratories.  Alternative techniques
to make a laboratory diagnosis of the
disease and specific viral subtypes
include molecular techniques such
as polymerase chain reactions (PCR),
i m m u n o f l u o re s c e n c e  u s i n g
monoclonal antibody to H5N1 or
enzyme linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) and immunofluorescent
antibody (IFAT) for detection of
specific antibodies. Appropriate
samples to send to the laboratory
i n c l u d e  n a s a l ,  t h r o a t  o r
nasopharyngeal swabs or aspirates,
bronchoa lveo la r  lavages  or
lungbiopsy.  All samples should be
sent to the laboratory in viral transport
medium. Serological tests can also
be per formed on acute and
convalescent sera.
Antiviral drugs used for the
treatment of influenza includes
amantadine, rimantadine, oseltamivir
(Tamiflu) and zanamivir (Relenza).
Influenza strains may become
resistant to any of these drugs and
the 2004 influenza A (H5N1) virus
identified in human patients in Asia,
is resistant to both amantidine and
rimantadine4. Patients with avian
influenza should be treated with a
neuraminidase inhibitor such as
oseltamivir 75 mg 2x/d for 5 days.
Treatment should start as early in the
cl in ical  course as possible.
Amantidine and rimantidine should
not be used because of resistance
associated with the H5N1 virus.
Resistance of H5N1 to oseltamivir has
already been described in Vietnam9
and Japan, complicating treatment.
Antimicrobials may be needed to
cover for secondary bacterial
infection.
Oseltamivir has recently been
registered by the MCC in South Africa
as a drug indicated for the prevention
and treatment of HPAI.
Vaccines:  Two problems are
associated with a H5N1 vaccine.
Since people have never been
exposed to H5N1, a primer vaccine
would have to be given followed by
a second dose a month later. Because
of this two-dose regimen, immunity
would take about 6 weeks to develop,
giving the virus a bigger window to
infect even immunized persons.
Secondly, a higher vaccine dose as
for other types of influenza is needed
to elicit an immune response, placing
a strain on manufacturer’s ability to
produce enough vaccine. There is
currently no vaccine against the H5N1
subtype but development is under
way and several different vaccines
have been produced for clinical
testing (Sanofi-Aventis, Chiron Corp.,
Glaxo-SmithKline all plan clinical trials
in 2006). The global capacity for
vaccine production is about 300
million doses and at least four to six
months will be needed to produce a
new vaccine capable of conferring
protection against a new subtype.
Infection control:  Infection control
will be of paramount importance in
containing a possible pandemic, and
the following guidelines are proposed:
• Isolate the patient in a single room
or cohort confirmed or suspected
cases. Negative pressure room
would be preferred
• Standard droplet and contact
precaut ions, wi th speci f ic
emphasis on the importance of
hand washing
• Patient visitors or Health Care
Workers (HCW) should wear a
high efficiency mask (N-95), gown,
face shield or goggles, gloves,
and boots or shoe covers3
• Limit the number of HCWs who
have contact with the patient, and
they should not look after other
patients
• HCWs who had potent ia l
unprotected contact with droplets
should be considered for post
exposure prophylaxis with
oseltamivir 75 mg/d for 7 days
• Infection control procedures
should stay in place for 7 days
after resolution of fever
Conclusion
An avian influenza pandemic might
have devastating consequences for
the world population. Culling of
infected domestic poultry, isolation
and appropriate treatment of infected
patients, the institution of sound
infection control measures and the
development of an effective vaccine
wi l l  be the cornerstones of
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